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Abstract — Internet of Things (IoT) is a pervasive environment 
to interconnect the things like: smart objects, devices etc. in a 
structure like internet. Things can be interconnected in IoT if 
these are uniquely addressable and identifiable. Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) is one the important radio frequency based 
addressing scheme in IoT. Major security challenge in resource 
constraint RFID networks is how to achieve traditional CIA 
security i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication. 
Computational and communication costs for Lightweight Mutual 
Authentication Protocol (LMAP), RFID mutual Authentication 
Protocol with Permutation (RAPP) and kazahaya authentication 
protocols are analyzed. These authentication protocols are 
modeled to analyze the delays using lightweight modeling 
language. Delay analysis is performed using alloy model over 
LMAP, RAPP and kazahaya authentication protocols where one 
datacenter (DC) is connected to different number of readers (1,5 
or 10) with connectivity to 1, 5 or 25 tags associated with reader 
and its results show that for LMAP delay varies from 30-156 
msec, for RAPP from 31-188 while for kazahaya from 61-374 
msec. Further, performance of RFID authentication protocols is 
analyzed for group construction through more than one DC (1,5 
or 10) with different number of readers (10, 50 or 100) and tags 
associated with these readers (50, 500, 1000) and results show 
that DC based binary tree topology with LMAP authentication 
protocol is having a minimum delay for 50 or 100 readers.  Other 
authentication protocols fail to give authentication results 
because of large delays in the network. Thus, RAPP and 
Kazahaya are not suitable for scenarios where there is large 
amount of increase in number of tags or readers.  
 
Index Terms — Authentication, Grouping, Lightweight, 
Modeling, RFID. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
FID systems are widely deployed in modern society. 
RFID technique is preferred over magnetic tapes, bar 
codes and smart cards due to its low cost and high speed. Due 
to this, its demand is continuously increasing which in turn 
also increasing the security risks associated with its uses.  Any 
nearby reader can read information written on unprotected 
tags, trace their locations, retrieve important information, 
accept  wrong  information  etc.   For   protecting   the   private 
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information written on an unprotected tag, some mechanism is 
required to deter the reader from revealing the important 
information. 
Tags are classified into authenticated and unauthenticated 
tags for an event in order to secure the system. Unlike 
unauthenticated tags, authenticated tags have strong 
mechanism to protect and prove their legacy. Authentication 
mechanisms allow a reader and a tag to protect each other by 
providing their authenticity. Since, RFID devices are resource 
constrained devices thus lightweight or ultra-lightweight 
mechanisms are preferred. Lightweight authentication 
protocols are weaker class of protocols as compared to normal 
authentication protocols. Lightweight pseudorandom number 
functions, cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs), one way 
lightweight hash functions at reader side etc. are allowed in 
lightweight authentication protocols. Ultra-lightweight 
authentication protocols are the weakest class of 
authentication protocols that uses logical bitwise operations 
only. RFID authentication system consists of three major 
tangible components: reader, tag and datacenter. Reader scans 
the tags for collecting required information and stores it in 
datacenter. These three components can prove the existence of 
a group through mutual authentication and grouping or yoking 
proofs. In mutual authentication and grouping through 
datacenter, each tag proves its authenticity with the reader and 
the reader stores the tag information in DC. DCs contain the 
information about each reader and tags associated with these 
readers. Here, reader cannot create group from identification 
information. It constructs groups if tags associated with 
products sequentially provide the information. For example, 
tag with identification from ‘A’ to ‘D’ are for category I 
product, ‘E’ to ‘G’ are for category II and so on. Now, DCs 
can also construct groups through two ways: (i) in a similar 
manner as constructed by reader or (ii) unique identification of 
reader and tags associated in a record stored in the DC 
constructs a group. Yoking proofs is another example of group 
authentication. In yoking proofs, multiple tags authenticate to 
one reader at a time. As compared to mutual authentication, 
subgroups can also be constructed by reader. Yoking proofs 
are refined form of mutual authentication that helps to 
construct group at lower level.  
In this work, computational and communication cost 
analysis is performed for LMAP, RAPP and kazahaya 
authentication protocol. Initially this analysis is performed 
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with one reader- one tag (LMAP, RAPP) or one reader-
multiple tag (kazahaya). Further, authentication for long 
distance connectivity is proposed through DCs. Multiple DCs 
are interconnected through different topologies for analyzing 
the group formation process. Here, it is assumed that DCs 
contain the authentic records. Authentic stored information 
helps to construct and identify groups in presence of multiple 
DCs, readers and tags. Lightweight modeling and analysis of 
proposed DCs based topologies are analyzed to find the fast 
and economic method.  
Rest of this work is organized as follows. Section II 
presents a critical review of mutual authentication and yoking 
proofs. Section III shows the notations and symbols used in 
this work. Section IV discusses the two mutual authentication 
(LMAP and RAPP) and one yoking proof (kazahaya) 
protocols. This section also describes the computational and 
communication cost analysis for these protocols. Section V 
proposes the group construction and cost estimation with DCs. 
Section VI presents the modeling and analysis of three 
authentication protocols using alloy model. This analysis is 
performed using different DCs based topologies for extending 
the authentication range with minimum delay. Finally the 
work ends up with the conclusion in section VII.    
II. RELATED WORK 
Authentication protocols in cryptography can be classified 
into four major categories: complete, normal, lightweight and 
ultra-lightweight [1][2]. Ultra-lightweight authentication is the 
weakest class of authentication protocols. Bitwise operators 
(AND, OR, XOR, NOT, left shift, right shift etc.), lightweight 
simple pseudorandom number functions etc. are only allowed 
in this category. These protocols can be classified as: mutual 
authentication protocol and grouping or yoking-proofs 
protocols. Several authentication protocols are proposed for 
low cost RFID system [3]-[7]. Most of these protocols are 
prone to recording, side channel, de-synchronization, man in 
the middle, tracing, information leakage attacks [8][9]. In 
mutual authentication protocols, Lightweight Mutual 
Authentication Protocol (LMAP) is the first authentication 
protocol in ultra-lightweight authentication protocol class. 
Other reader to tag mutual authentication protocols are: 
EMAP, SASI, Gossamer, David-Prasad, HB+, M2AP, RAPP 
etc. [10][11]. These authentication mechanisms are extended 
to create yoking or grouping proofs. Juels proposed the first 
idea of yoking that scans two tags simultaneously [12]. 
Several grouping protocols are proposed and analyzed in 
recent years [2]. Most of these protocols are prone to replay 
attack and uses different mechanisms to avoid this attack. 
These mechanisms include genetic programming, 
timestamping, random number etc. Kazahaya is one among of 
them that ensure the security guidelines required to create a 
group [2]. This protocol uses multiple tag and single reader 
authentication for creating the groups. These authentication 
protocols are used in various applications like: supply chain 
management, library management, traffic control system etc. 
[13]. Most of these applications face a major challenge of cost 
estimation in financial institutions [14]. This cost is tried to be 
minimum using various data center based topologies [15]. 
None of the earlier recent work has performed computational 
and communicational cost estimation of authentication 
protocols for data center based topologies. This work extends 
the data center based economic topologies to authenticate long 
distance placed RFID devices.        
III. SYMBOLS 
The symbols used in this work are shown in table 1. 




𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖  Identification pseudonym of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ tag. 
𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖/ 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑖 Identification of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ tag/ reader 
𝑟𝑛𝑖 𝑖
𝑡ℎ random number 
𝐾𝑇𝑖
𝑗
 jth key variable for ith tag 
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑖
𝑘  Kth data center attached to ith reader. 
𝑅𝑖 / 𝑇𝑖 𝑖
𝑡ℎ reader or tag 
IV. COST ANALYSIS OF AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
A. LMAP 
LMAP is an ultra-lightweight mutual authentication 
protocol with four communications between each tag and 
reader [2][10]. LMAP uses simple bitwise operations: XOR, 
AND, OR and modulus 2n. Tag used in this protocol requires 
480 bits of rewritable memory. One identification constant 
(𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖) and five key variables (four key variables (𝐾𝑇𝑖
𝑗
 , 
j∈{1,2,3,4}, i∈{1,2…n}) and one pseudonym (𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)) with size 
of each of 96 bits are updated after each round of 
authentication. Number of rounds of authentication is 
dependent on number of times of reader or processes attached 
to reader which want to update the 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖in database. The 




 : {“hello”} 
2. 𝑇𝑙
  𝑅𝑖
 : {𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖} 
3. 𝑅𝑖
 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑖
𝑘 : {𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖} 
4. 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑖
𝑘   𝑅𝑖
 : { 𝐾𝑇𝑙
𝑗
 , j∈{1,2,3,4}}, {𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖} 
5. 𝑅𝑖
  𝑇𝑙
 : {𝑉1|| 𝑉2||𝑉3} , where 𝑉1= (𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)
n ⊕ (𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n ⊕ 
𝑟𝑛1, 𝑉2= ((𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)
n ⋁(𝐾𝑇𝑙





1 )n ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2 ⊕ ((𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n + 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖), 
(𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n+1= (𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2 ⊕ ((𝐾𝑇𝑙
4 )n + 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖),  (𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n+1= 
((𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n ⊕  𝑟𝑛1) + ((𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖),  (𝐾𝑇𝑙
4 )n+1= 
((𝐾𝑇𝑙
4 )n ⊕  𝑟𝑛1) + ((𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖) and (𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)
n+1= 
(𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)
n + (𝑟𝑛2 ⊕(𝐾𝑇𝑙
4 )n) ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖 .  
6. 𝑇𝑙
  𝑅𝑖
 : {𝑉4}, where 𝑉4=((𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖)
n + 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖) ⊕  𝑟𝑛1 ⊕
𝑟𝑛2. Here, 𝑇𝑙
  extracts 𝑟𝑛1, verify 𝑉2and generate 𝑉4. 
7. 𝑅𝑖
 : Verify {𝑉 4}. 
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Table II and III show the computational and communication 
cost of single run in one reader, one tag and one DC for 
LMAP in n-rounds. Results show that computational cost of 
tag is higher than reader and communication cost of reader is 
higher than tag. Since multiple tags are attached to one reader 
thus overall computational and communication cost of reader 
is much higher than single tag cost.  
TABLE II.  COMPUTATIONAL COST IN LMAP 
Parameter Reader Cost Tag Cost 
Number of bitwise-XOR operations 12n 18n 
Number of bitwise- OR operations n n 
Number of Addition (mod 2n) operations 8n 9n 
Number of Constant stored _ 1 
Variable updating cost 105n 140n 
 
TABLE III.  COMMUNICATION COST IN LMAP 
Parameter Reader Cost Tag Cost 
Number of messages 3n+2 2n 
Size of message (sent) (328n+96) bits 192n bits 
Size of message (received) (192n+480) bits 328n 
B. RAPP 
RAPP is an ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol 
to avoid de-synchronization attack [11]. This protocol is 
different from existing authentication protocols because of 
permutation operations. It uses data permutation rather than 




 : {“hello”} 
2. 𝑇𝑙
  𝑅𝑖
 : {𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖} 
3. 𝑅𝑖
 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑖
𝑘 : {𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖} 
4. 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑖
𝑘   𝑅𝑖
 : { 𝐾𝑇𝑙
𝑗
 , j𝜖{1,2,3}}, {𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖} 
5. 𝑅𝑖
  𝑇𝑙
 : {𝑉1|| 𝑉2} , where 𝑉1=Permutation((𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n, 
(𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n) ⊕  𝑟𝑛1, 𝑉2= Permutation(((𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n⊕(𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n), Rot 








2 )n , 𝑟𝑛1) ⊕(𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n), (𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n+1 = 
Permutation((𝐾𝑇𝑙




n ,  (𝑟𝑛1 ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2)) ⊕ 
(𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 )n ⊕ (𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n ⊕ (𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n . 
6. 𝑇𝑙
  𝑅𝑖
 : {𝑉3}, 𝑉3= Permutation ((𝑟𝑛1 ⊕(𝐾𝑇𝑙
1 ), 
(𝑟𝑛1 ⊕(𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑖 . 
7. 𝑅𝑖
  𝑇𝑙




3 )n, Rot(𝑟𝑛2, 𝑟𝑛2)) 
⊕Permutation(𝑟𝑛1, (𝐾𝑇𝑙
3 )n ⊕ (𝐾𝑇𝑙
2 )n). 
Table IV and V show the computational and 
communicational cost of single run in one reader, one tag and 
one DC for RAPP in n-rounds. Results show that 
computational and communication cost of tag is lesser than 
reader. The cost of computational and communication for 
reader increases at higher rate than tag with increase in 
number of tags attached to reader. 
TABLE IV.  COMPUTATIONAL COST IN RAPP 
Parameter Reader Cost Tag Cost 
Number of bitwise-XOR operations 16n 14n 
Number of bitwise- Shift operations 192n - 
Number of Permutation Operations 16n 7n 
Number of Constant stored - 1 
Variable updating cost 224n 21n 
TABLE V.  COMMUNICATION COST IN RAPP 
Parameter Reader Cost Tag Cost 
Number of messages 5n 2n 
Size of message (sent) (424n + 96) bits 192n bits 
Size of message (received) (192n + 384n) bits 424n 
C. Kazahaya: An RFID Grouping Protocol for Low-Cost 
RFID Tags 
Peris et. al. proposed Kazahaya protocol for groups with 
special interest [2]. Each group has a unique identification 
number and group key. Datacenter attached to reader stores 
the identification marks of tags in a group to identify the 
groups. Kazahaya is designed to meet the security 


















𝑇𝑙are two random number generated by 𝑇𝑎. 𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
1 = 
PRNG (𝐼𝐷𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2





= PRNG(𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑙 ⊕ 𝑟𝑛1
𝑇𝑙 ⊕ PRNG(𝐾𝑇𝑙
 ) 
⊕PRNG(TSn+1)). Here, 𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is the group key, 
𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
1  and 𝐼𝑇𝑎
  are the temporary variables. 
3 𝑅𝑖
  𝑇𝑚





 }. Reader store 𝑟𝑛1
𝑇𝑙. 
4 𝑇𝑚
  verifies 𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
1  equals PRNG (𝐼𝐷𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2
𝑇𝑙 ⊕
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝) ⊕ PRNG (TSn)). If it equals then it 






































  stores 𝑟𝑛1
𝑇𝑚. 
6 𝑇𝑙
  verifies 𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
2  equals PRNG (𝐼𝐷𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 ⊕ 𝑟𝑛2
𝑇𝑚 ⊕
𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺(𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝) ⊕ PRNG (𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
1 )). If it equals then it 



















  generate evidence 𝑒𝑛





Table VI and VII show the computational and 
communicational cost of single run in one reader, two tags and 
one DC for Kazahaya authentication protocol in n-rounds. 
Results show that computational cost of reader is negligible as 
compared to group tag cost whereas communication cost of 
reader is higher than any individual tag cost. Computational 
cost of first tag is higher than second tag and communication 
cost of first tag is double the cost of second tag.    








Number of bitwise-XOR 
operations 
- 12n 9n 
Number of bitwise-PRNG 
operations 
- 12n 9n 
Number of Addition Operations - 2n - 
Number of Variable stored 2n - - 
Variable updating cost - 4n 3n 








Number of messages 8n 4n 2n 
Number of messages 
(sent) 
4n 2n n 
Number of messages 
(received) 
3n 2n n 
V. COST ANALYSIS OF LONG RANGE GROUP 
AUTHENTICATION 
Figure 1 shows an example where 4 DCs are connected in a 
circular topology, 3 readers are connected with each DC and 
each reader can scan 3 tags simultaneously. Similarly, more 
DCs can be connected and tags are considered to be authentic 
if DC contains the record of respective tags. DCs 
communicate in circular topology for synchronizing the tag 
records. Tag record packet comes back to original resource 
after updating the data in every DC and gives 
acknowledgement that record has been updated in every DC. 
This approach can be extended for more number of RFID 
devices including data centers. Reader cost of computation 
increases with increase in number of tags attached to it. 
Similarly, data centers cost also increases with increase in 
readers attached to it. In computational cost, nearby DC stores 
5 variables and 1 constant for LMAP, 4 variables and 1 
constant for RAPP, and 2 variables and 1 constant for 
kazahaya authentication protocol. Variables in LMAP and 
RAPP are updated once in n-rounds whereas these are updated 
n-times in n-rounds for kazahaya. For calculating 
communication cost, tag-reader mutual authentication 
communication cost is added to DC communication cost. 
Various designs of scanning the tags by readers, attachments 
of DCs to readers and integration of DCs are followed to: 
improve the centralized or distributed network control, reduce 
the computational or communication cost, enhance the 
network performance and increase the availability of data. 
These DCs are connected in various other ways: (i) peer to 





In peer to peer connectivity, any DC can establish 
connection with any other DC in one to one manner. 
Synchronization of DCs is necessary to ease the availability of 
data. This synchronization occurs in proactive or reactive 
manner. Proactive data updating procedure stores the data at 
local DCs prior to any request. This may follow a time clock 
to synchronize and update the data. In reactive procedure, 
whenever there is need to access the data then a new 
connection is established to synchronize the required data. In 
proactive case, ‘n-1’ communications are required to update 
the records. In reactive case, if ‘b’-bunch of requests are 
updated simultaneously then floor((n-1)/b) communications 
are required. Figure 2 shows pseudo-code of updating the DC 
records in peer to peer connection. This approach avoids the 
drawback of central point failure. This is a good approach for 
file sharing in a small network. IoT in close vicinity allows the 
file sharing at much faster rate compared to centralized or 
circular approach. 
 
1. for i=1 to m-1: 
2. for j=i+1 to m: 
3. DC[i]DC[j]: Exchange(𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖, 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑙, Keys) 
Figure 1: 3T-3R-4DC Design (with DC as in circular topology). 





1. for i=1 to m-1: 
2. if local LMDC exist then : 
3. DC[i]LMDC: Exchange(𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖, 𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑙, Keys) 
4. If more LMDC exist then: 








In centralized connectivity, a central master DC (MDC) is 
maintained that updates the records from local DCs or local 
MDCs (LMDC). Here, DCs are connected to LMDC or MDC. 
There may be multiple LMDCs in the path. Figure 3 shows the 
pseudo-code of updating the MDC from DCs. These records 
update are processed either to direct connection between DC 
and MDC or DC to multiple LMDC and then finally with 
MDC. Cost of communication increases with each connection. 
If DC is ‘r’ connections away from MDC then 6r variables and 
one constant updates per record are required for LMAP. For 
RAPP, this cost reduces to 5r variables and one constant. This 
cost is 4r variables and two constants for kazahaya. However, 
this cost can be minimized if multiple records are updated at 
same time in any DC.   
K-ary tree construction method is another centralized 
mechanism that improves the communication cost and 
provides multiple centralized points to update the records. 
Figure 4 shows an example of 3-ary centralized tree 
construction. There are multiple BDCs that are central points 
to manage the records and do not interact directly with the 
readers. In worst case, if n-tags are attached to single reader, 
n-readers to single DC, n-DCs to single BDC and n-BDCs to 
single MDC then cost of updating all the records is nlognn. 
This approach is preferred if BDCs are placed a distance apart 
but if some BDCs are closely connected then (n-m)-tree 
construction is preferable. Figure 5 shows an example of (2-
3)-ary tree construction. In worst case, if ‘n’ tags are 
connected to single reader, n-readers to single DC, m-DC to 
single BDC and m-BDC to single BDC in its parent layer then 
cost of updating all the records is less than nlognn.   
Table VIII shows the comparative analysis of 
communication complexities. It shows that centralized 
mechanisms are having better communication complexities 
compared to circular or peer to peer connectivity. A 
centralized mechanism provides better resistance to attacks 
compared to de-centralized mechanism. These communication 






TABLE VIII.  COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY 
Circular O(n2) 
Centralized O(lognn) 
Peer to Peer O(n2) 
k-Tree O(lognn) 
n-m Tree O(lognn) 
 
new data record in DCs. The proposed approaches of 
constructing large RFID network group deployment is better 
in terms of security, extendibility and design simplicity 
compared to existing distributed or proximity based network 
topology construction using genetic algorithms [16][17]. 
Distributed designs have limited scalability and performance 
Figure 2: DC design with peer to peer connectivity. 
Figure 3: DC design with centralized Master Data Center (MDC) Figure 4: 3-ary tree design for data centers 
Figure 5: (2-3)- ary tree design for data centers 
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of network decreases with fixed approach to transfer data and 
construct groups [16]. Security, scalability and performance of 
networks are extended with increase in data centers and their 
connectivity in proposed techniques. There is increase in 
security because the use of authentication protocols enhances 
the valid users to take part in data transfer. Here, performance 
of network is not affected because large part of 
communication cost for data exchange is bearded by data 
centers and their connectivity. These data centers reduce the 
use of other hardware devices in the networks. Zhao et. al. 
design use switches, routers and other network devices to 
transfer the data [16]. A dedicated network design in this 
approach reduces the security of network because same link is 
used for a long time to transfer the data. However, the 
techniques proposed in this work estimate the proximity of 
devices to transfer the data in an authenticated way. Genetic 
algorithm based network design also use proximity of RFID 
devices to exchange information [17]. But this approach is 
good for short range connectivity. More RFID network 
designs are required to extend the possibility of information 
availability. Thus, proposed current work is better than 
existing approaches to exchange information and construct 
long range information availability groups. This is important 
for various applications especially IoT. 
VI. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
 
The proposed group schemes are tested for low cost passive 
RFID EM4100 family transponder tags. Reader has the 
reading distance of 10-15 centimeters at 125 KHz reading 
frequency. Transponder tag contains unique identifier selected 
from billions of possible combinations. Reader reads this 
identifier and transmits to data centre server via a simple serial 
interface. Tag identifier works with 64-bits data stream which 
includes header, identification, data and parity bits. Alloy 
language and model is used for modeling and testing the 
protocols. Results obtained after modeling is important for 
designing applications in various domains like: household 
security devices, position locating and tracking services, data 
sharing applications, medicating the patients in healthcare 
systems, supply chain management, etc. Result data is 
quantitatively important to design more efficient applications 
with group construction methods.   
In modeling of lightweight authentication protocol, reader, 
tags and DCs are kept as independent entities. Reader scans 
the tags. Identification pseudonyms, identification constant, 
and keys are stored in datacenters. Figure 6 shows a LMAP 
alloy model for single reader and single tag authentication 
[18]. After sending IS to reader, datacenter generates the keys 
and forwards these to reader. Reader receives keys and tag 
identification for generating next message. Table IX shows the 
delay analysis when protocols are analyzed using alloy model. 
Results show that LMAP protocol is having minimum delay 
compared to RAPP or kazahaya. Three different scenarios are 
taken into consideration with variations in readers and tags. In 
first scenario, one datacenter is connected to one reader and 1, 
5 or 25 tags. Readers are increased to 5 with connectivity of 1, 
5 or 25 tags to each reader in second scenario. Numbers of 
readers are further increases to 10 with 1, 5 or 50 tags to each 
reader in third scenario. Results show that delay in RAPP or 
LMAP is half of Kazahaya in worst scenarios. Increase in 
delay is because of increase in tags rather than increase in 
readers. When readers are increased then delay decreases 
because more devices are available to handle tags. Here, 
parallel operations reduce the delays. However, when ratio of 
number of tags to number of readers increases then delays also 
increases. This increase is highest for kazahaya and lowest for 
LMAP.  
 
Figure 6: LMAP model for single reader-single tag authentication. 
TABLE IX.  DELAY ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF READERS AND 
TAGS ASSOCIATED WITH READERS. 
Readers Tags Time [msec] 
LMAP RAPP Kazahaya 
1 1 30 31 61 
1 5 62 70 112 
1 25 94 97 131 
5 5 32 47 86 
5 25 62 76 113 
5 125 96 102 144 
10 10 40 31 87 
10 50 94 104 156 
10 500 156 188 374 
     
 
Figure 7a: 4-Data Centers update their records from Readers and Tags 
 
Figure 7b: Data Centers exchange records in parallel. 
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Figure 7c: Each Data Center Update its records. 
 
 
Figure 7d: Data Centers update their records in circular connectivity. 
 
 
Figure 7e: Each Data Centers update records with other data centers in peer  
to peer connectivity. 
 
Figure 7f:  Data Centers update their records in Centralized MDC 
connectivity. 
 
Figure 7g:  Data Centers update their records in Tree (k=2) connectivity. 
 
Figures 7a to 7g show an example how 4 DCs update their 
records through different topologies. Figure 7a shows an 
example how four DCs update their records from readers that 
are connected to tags. DCs exchange their records in parallel 
to synchronize the data after fetching records from readers. 
Figure 7b shows how a pair of DCs exchanges the data in 
parallel. Once data is exchanged then each DC matches the 
received data with stored data to update its records as shown 
in figure 7c. Now, DCs can update their records using circular, 
peer to peer or centralized topology. Figure 7d shows an 
example how four DCs exchange and update their records in 
curricular process. Any two nearby DCs can exchange and 
update their information in circular topology. It is bidirectional 
and exchange or update is possible simultaneously. Figure 7c 
shows the exchange and updating process of DC0 with DC3 
and DC1 with DC2. Figure 7d shows the exchange process of 
DC0 with DC1 and DC2 with DC3. Alloy analysis also shows 
the possibility of data updation between DC0 with DC3 and 
DC1 with DC2. Figure 7e shows the record exchange and 
update process in peer to peer connectivity. Here, each DC 
updates its record with every other DC. Figure 7f shows an 
example of centralized star connectivity. In this example, DC3 
is acting as master centralized DC, i.e. MDC and all other DCs 
update their records through single MDC (i.e. DC3). 
Communication overhead for DC3 in this topology is highest 
among all. Updating process with sequence number 1 is 
processed first then process with sequence number 2 is 
executed to update the records. This record updation is also 
possible through tree topology as shows in figure 7g. DC3 is 
child DC of DC2, and DC1 and DC2 are child DC of DC0. 
Each child DC updates its record with its parent DC. DCs 
create tree with fixed or variable number of child DCs. 
Examples of fixed number of child are: uniary (serial, k=1), 
binary (k=2), ternary (k=3), quaternion (k=4) and so on. 
Variable numbers of DCs examples are: (n-m)-ary tree, (n-m-
o)-ary tree, R-tree, X-tree etc.  
 
TABLE X.  DELAY ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF DCS, READERS 
AND TAGS FOR VARIOUS TOPOLOGIES. 
Data 
Centers 
Readers Tags Time [msec] 
LMAP RAPP Kazahaya 
Circular Topology 
1 10 50 94 104 156 
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5 50 500 274 312 441 
10 100 1000 543 timeout timeout 
Peer to Peer Connectivity 
1 10 50 94 104 156 
5 50 500 345 413 653 
10 100 1000 651 timeout timeout 
Centralized MDC Connectivity 
1 10 50 94 104 156 
5 50 500 378 410 534 
10 100 1000 614 917 1123 
K-ary tree connectivity (with k=2) 
1 10 50 94 104 156 
5 50 500 238 319 450 
10 100 1000 489 875 1031 
(2-3)-ary Tree Connectivity 
1 10 50 94 104 156 
5 50 500 316 367 511 
10 100 1000 553 890 1092 
 
Table X shows the delay analysis with increase in readers, 
tags or DCs, or connectivity of multiple DCs through different 
topologies. Two de-centralized (circular and peer to peer) and 
three centralized (central MDC, K-ary tree and (2-3)-ary tree 
connectivity) approaches are considered for delay analysis. 
Results show that when single DC is considered for storage 
with 10 readers and 50 tags then delay is least. This is because 
data storage is occurring parallel to reader-tag authentication 
operations. Delay increases with increase in DCs or increase in 
reader and tags connected with these DCs. Centralized 
approaches consume less delay compared to de-centralized 
approaches with increase in DCs, readers or tags. Increase in 
delay is minimum for K-ary tree (with k=2) and maximum for 
peer to peer connectivity. When readers and tags are increased 
to a large number then it becomes almost impossible for 
centralized mechanism to synchronize the data records within 
a stipulated time. However, if delays are not important then it 
is possible to synchronize the data records with maximum 
fault tolerance in large networks for RAPP and kazahaya 
protocols using de-centralized mechanisms. Overall, LMAP is 
found to have minimum delay among centralized or de-
centralized approaches compared to other protocols. Delay 
comparison with existing techniques shows that the proposed 
mechanisms are having less delay and its variations. A 
variation of less than 1/100 msec. is observed as compare to 
other similar techniques [19].            
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work, two mutual and one yoking proof 
authentication protocols are extended to construct long range 
groups. This work is an extension to cost-benefit analysis 
using authentication protocols in DCs [15]. Here, groups are 
constructed through DCs. DCs follow different topology to 
update their records and extend the information availability. 
This information also extends the authenticity of tags in a 
large group. Further, DC connectivity is analyzed through 
lightweight modeling language to estimate the delays in 
construction of different DCs based connectivity models. 
Among three protocols (LMAP, RAPP and kazahaya), LMAP 
has shown the minimum delay for one reader and attachment 
of multiple tags (maximum tags = 50). De-centralized DC 
topologies are better compared to centralize for small scale 
authentication through DCs. A maximum of 651 msec. delay 
is observed in de-centralized peer to peer connectivity as 
compared to 614 msec. in centralized MDC connectivity using 
LMAP protocol. Results show that there are large delays using 
RAPP and Kazahaya for centralized topologies compared to 
de-centralized topologies for large scale networks. These tests 
are valid for passive devices that support the lightweight 
authentication protocol.  
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